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SECTION I
 
INTRODUCTION
 
As modern aircraft became larger, faster and more numerous, the 
need for an effective airborne collision avoidance system to back up the 
air traffic control system has become more and more urgent. One need 
only consider the number of collisions and near-collisions to see why a 
sense of urgency has now permeated all levels of agencies and organiza­
tions interested in and responsible for air safety. 
The history of collision avoidance development since the early 1950's 
can be summarized in a list of systems and techniques that have been tried 
and found wanting, usually on technical grounds. These past attempts have 
now culminated in the channeling of almost all present day effort toward the 
developmentof a new system, the so called Time-Frequency System, which 
shows promise of overcoming many of the problems that beset the collision 
avoidance systems proposed in the past. 
However, the effectiveness of the Time-Frequency system cannot be 
judged on a purely technical basis. Economic and operational factors such 
as the high initial cost to the aircraft operator and the complexity of air­
borne equipment that is often difficult to maintain could inhibit universal 
acceptance of the system and thus destroy its effectiveness by limiting the 
number of equipped aircraft to those whose operators can afford the installa­
tion. This drawback is recognized generally, and it is to be expected that 
proposals for improved systems will be made from time to time. 
This report records the results of a preliminary investigation of the 
technical feasibility of one such proposal - the SAVAS concept- which has 
1 
been advanced by NASA's Electronics Research Center of Cambridge, 
Massachusetts. An overall description of the proposed system appears 
in Section 2 of the report. 
To assess the feasibility of the concept, both the theoretical and equip­
ment aspects of SAVAS have been considered. The system theory has been 
studied in detail, with emphasis placed on operational usage, and a number 
of system problems have been identified that will require further concep­
tual development. System operation is discussed in Section 3. In the 
equipment area, an extensive review has been made of possible techniques 
for implementing the SAVAS system. Preliminary design alternatives and 
component values have been developed to clarify the equipment problems 
and to provide a sense of the amount and complexity of equipment required. 
This work is described in Sections 4 and 5. 
The general findings from these studies has been that a number of 
very formidable development problems must be resolved in order for the 
SAVAS concept to attain operational candidacy. The detailed study con­
clusions, and recommendations oi priorities in future work are discussed 
in Section 6. 
The investigation was carried out at the MITRE Corporation, Bedford, 
Massachusetts, under Contract No. NAS 12-2078. 
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SECTION4 2
 
REVIEW OF SATELLITE AIDED
 
VEHICLE .AVOIDANCE SYSTEM ,(SAVAS)
 
The fundamental feature of the SAVAS system is the useof a signal 
from a satellite to synchronize a responding signal from each aircraft. 
Upon receipt of the signal from the satellite, each aircraft initiates .a clock 
.and ,a receiving gate with the minimum possible delay and, at -the same time, 
transmits a responding signal. Each aircraft then receives the responding 
signal -of all other aircraft within its range and measures the time delay -of 
,eachof these signals with respect to the starting time of its clockand 
,receiving gate, and also measures the rate of change of time delay. These 
two parameters are then processed in a way which permits a decision as 
to the existence or non-existance of a hazard of 'collision. ­
.2.1 THE TWO-FREQUENCY SYSTEM 
* 'The two-frequency SA-VAS system is the basic configuration. In this 
system, the satellite transmits 'aperiodic signal at a frequency, fI The 
transmission may be in the form of a pulse train ,modulated ona carrier ,df 
frequency, fl, or any other modulation which will mark off equal intervals 
of time. Although farther investigationwill ,probably disclose an optimum 
,rate for this transmission, for expository purposes, it can be assumed 
that the time interval lies somewhere between one and five milliseconds. 
-s zeach pulse, or mark, is received'by an equipped aircraft, -a 
'receiVing gate and a cloc'k are started and allowed to run for an interval 
which -can be 'made either fixed or adjustable. .At the same time that the 
gate and clock.are initiated, the aircraft emits ,a signal at a frequency, 
f2 . The f2 signal serves two purposes.: it permits the measurement.of 
3 
a time delay in all other aircraft which receive the f2 signal, and it pro­
vides a vehicle for the exchange of certain essential information between 
aircraft. 
In each cycle or period of transmission, each equipped aircraft receives 
the 1l transmission from the satellite first, followed by the responding 
f2 signals from all other aircraft in its neighborhood. It then proceeds to 
measure the time delay between each f2 signal received and the beginning 
of its receiving gate. Assuming negligible delays in the equipment, these 
time delays are equivalent to the delays between each f2 signal and the f1 
signal which initiated the receiving gate. Each time delay, T, between an 
f2 signal and the f signal, defines an ellipsoid of revolution with the 
satellite at one focus and the receiving, or protected aircraft at the other. 
In addition to measuring the time delay, T, for each received f2 
signal, the protected aircraft also measures the rate of change of delay, 
T. These two measurements are then processed in accordance with a 
set of logical rules to determine whether a hazard of collision exists. If 
it is determined that a hazard exists, one or both aircraft are commanded 
to perform an evasive maneuver, an ascent or descent, in accordance with 
operational doctrine. 
The logical rules used to determine the existance of a hazard are 
based on the assumption that all aircraft involved are moving in straight 
lines at constant speed and altitude when the measurements of T and T 
are made. To assure that this condition is true, means must be provided 
to command aircraft to cease all horizontal and vertical maneuvers before 
the alarm zone is reached. The first step in the alarm assessment is then 
to compare the relative altitude of the aircraft. This clearly requires that 
4
 
information about the altitude of all intruding aircraft be available in each 
protected aircraft. Information can be made available via modulation 
on the f2 response. If the altitude of the two aircraft differ by more 
than some pre-set quantity, the intruder is not considered a hazard 
and no further action is taken except to warn of the presence of another air­
craft above or below, as the case may be. If the altitudes fall within a band 
determined by operational doctrine to be hazardous, the aircraft are con­
sidered to be co-altitude and further processing of the measurements of T 
and ±k is necessary to determine the possibility of a collision. Each air­
craft computes the value of T/T for each co-altitude f2 response it 
receives, and when this quantity falls below a pre-set constant, 7-, a col­
lision is considered imminent and one or both aircraft are commanded to 
take evasive action. 
Since T depends on the closing speed of the two aircraft involved, 
a situation could arise wherein two co-altitude aircraft approach each 
other on slowly converging courses with very low T. The value of k 
could then fall dangerously low while T/T remains well above the r thres­
hold. To prevent a collision under these circumstances, a minimum T 
alarm is also required. 
2.2 TRANSPONDER SYSTEM USING THREE FREQUENCIES 
In the brief description of the basic SAVAS configuration in the pre­
vious paragraph, it will be noted that the range, or the rate of change of 
range, between the protected aircraft and the intruding aircraft are not 
considered. The only quantities that can be measured are the time delay, 
T, between the receipt of the f transmission from the satellite and the 
receipt of the f2 transmission from the intruding aircraft, and the rate 
of change of time delay, T. Moreover, because of the elliptical geometry, 
5 
the range associated with any value of T can vary over wide limits, particu­
larly when the elevation angle of the satellite, as seen from the protected 
aircraft, is low. For example, for a satellite elevation angle of 60 degrees, 
the range to the intruder for a fixed time delay, T, will vary over a range of 
of 3 to 1, and for a satellite elevation angle of 30 degrees, the variation will 
be 14 to 1. 
The true range between the protected aircraft and the intruder air­
craft can be found by means of a system which is an extension of the basic 
two-frequency SAVAS configuration. In the extended system, each air­
craft carries an fI receiver, as before, and initiates a clock and receiv­
ing gate upon receipt of the fI signal from the satellite and also responds 
with an signal. Each aircraft which receives an f2 signal againf2 
measures the delay, T, and delay rate, T, in the usual way but in this 
case also responds with a signal at a frequency f 3 . Each aircraft must 
carry an f3 receiver and, upon receipt of an f 3 signal, measures the 
delay and delay rate between each f3 signal and its own f signal or, 
equivalently, the f2 signal. This delay now defines a spherical geometry, 
the f3 delay being directly proportional to the true range to the intruder, 
R, and the rate of change of delay proportional to R. 
In a two-aircraft encounter, this basic three-frequency system will 
provide mutual exchange of range, range rate, and other information that 
can be encoded on the f2 or f3 responses. When more than two aircraft 
are in proximity however, the system is vulnerable to spurious responses. 
For example, in a three-aircraft situation, there will be three f2 trans­
missions, each of which will evoke two f3 responses, for a total of six. 
Assuming that each aircraft ignores its own f responses, it will then3 
6
 
receive four others, only two of which are valid responses to its own f2 
interrogations, the other two being the responses of the intruding aircraft 
to each other. 
A possible solution to this problem is the use of two f2 responses in 
each aircraft. The first would again be simultaneous with the receipt of the 
f1 signal from the satellite and would be used in all other aircraft to 
measure the delay as usual. The second f2 response would be transmitted 
after a short delay which could be varied slightly from pulse to pulse. The 
second f2 pulse would also initiate a second gate and clock, and the delay 
of any received f3 pulse would be measured with respect to these. Of 
course, the f3 transponder in each aircraft would be designed to ignore 
the first of the f2 pulses and respond only to the second. 
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SECTION 3 
SAVAS SYSTEM OPERATION (TWO-FREQUENCY SYSTEM) 
This section considers the detailed operation of the two-frequency 
SAVAS system that has been outlined in Section.2. Emphasis has been 
placed on the identification and description of a number of areas and prob­
lems needing further study. 
The symbols and coordinate system used in this section are as 
follows -(see Figure 1); 
a Azimuth angle of satellite from protected aircraft 
E Elevation angle of satellite from protected aircraft 
e Angle between V and g
s 
q. Angle between S and 
Ir Time'to projected collision 
A Duration of each aircraft transmission 
a Azimuth angle of intruder from protected aircraft 
e Elevation angle of intruder from protected aircraft 
h Angle of relative velocity vector 
(relative heading of intruder) 
D Vector, S - R 
R Vector, relative -positionof intruder 
Vector, position of satellite with respect to protected aircraft 
Vector, relative velocity of intruder 
9 
V 
SATELLITE 	 z 
VS 
4' NOTE 	 INCO-ALTITUDE CASE, V IS 
CONSTRAINEO TO LIE IN THE 
X-Y PLANE, AND THE ANGLE, h, 
IS THE ANGLE V MAKES WITH 
THE POSITIVE X-AXIS 
INTRUDER AIRCRAFT 
'PROTECTED
 
y 	 ~ AIC RAFTR-
Figure 1. SAVAS Coordinate System 
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V Vector, relative velocity of satellite 
s 
D Absolute value of D 
'R Absolute value of 
S Absolute value of 
V Absolute value of 
V5 Absolute value ofV 
s s 
* Signal delay 
C Velocity of light in vacuum 
i, j, k Unit vectors in a cartesian coordinate system. 
Derivative of any quantity with respect to time is denoted by a dot 
above the quantity. 
dT 
i.e., rk is - , etc. 
3. 1 WARNING REGIONS 
The SAVAS concept employs two basic warning regions: (1) alert re­
.gions, in which potentially threatening intruder aircraft must halt vertical 
and horizontal maneuvers, and (2) alarm regions, in which hazardous 
collision conditions are determined to exist and evasive action in accordance 
with promulgated doctrine is needed. 
3.1.1 Alarm Regions 
3.1.1.1 Criteria 
The collision threat or alarm regions. for SAVAS are determined 
from three sensory derived criteria: (1) T/T, the quotient of signal delay 
11 
and rate of change of signal delay (i.e., the minimum time to projected 
collision); (2) Rmin, the minimum proximity or slant range between air­
craft; and (3) ±_Hmax, the maximum altitude difference for any credible 
threat. 
T/T 
Equation (23) of Appendix I gives the co-altitude alarm zone produced 
by the T/T criterion as, 
1 cos a
R!V [cos a -cos e
Vr ~ CO E-COSco (a-U)J 1 
where: 
E = elevation angle of the satellite; 
a = azimuth of the intruder aircraft; 
a = azimuth angle of satellite; 
T = delay between transmission of f2 signal by protected aircraft 
and reception of intruder f2 signal by protected aircraft; 
T = rate of change of T; 
r 
T = threshold value of TT 
i.e. -T < i- denotes hazard of collision; ± < 0, '->0. 
That is, the alarm is given when this equation is true and is not given if: 
V [ cos a - cos E cos a (2R>Vr -cos ecos (a-a) (2) 
12
 
R 
mm 
When V is sufficiently low, R can become very small without setting 
off the T/T alarm. This situation arises when two aircraft at the same 
altitude are on slowly converging courses, and can result in R becoming 
small enough to produce a collision because the T/T alarm is actuated 
too late for evasive action. To avoid this possibility, a minimum range 
warning or-alarm is necessary. However, since range is not directly avail­
able, a lower threshold of signal delay, T, must be established. 
The co-altitude range is given by Equation (22) of Appendix I as, 
R= CT (3) 
1-cosecos (a-a) 
where 
C = Velocity of light. 
If we. set a minimum threshold for T, 
CT 
R= m (4)1 -Cos C Cos (a-a) 
At the point where the fraction is a minimum, we have, 
CTmin = (1 + cos amin) Rmin (5) 
Thus, for a minimum range of 3 km and a minimum satellite elevation 
angle of 60 degrees, 
13 
6T. =15x 10 - sec. 
An important consequence of this quantity, T,in' is that the f2 
response of the protected aircraft must be completed in a time that is short 
compared to Train, since while it is transmitting its own f2 signal, it 
cannot receive the f2 signals of intruder aircraft. 
The co-altitude range at which an R . warning will be given is 
then: 
Rmin (1 + cos min)
 
1 -cos Ecos (a-a) (6)
 
where Rmin (I + cos Emin) is a constant that is set by operational doctrine. 
A plot of the quantity: 
1 (7) 
1- Cos COS (a-a) 
is shown by Figure 2 for satellite elevation angles of 30 and 60 degrees. 
The scales can be converted to the true co-altitude minimum warning range 
by multiplying by the quantity Rmi n (1 + cos Cmin). The shape and size of 
the figure are independent of satellite azimuth, but its major axis is always 
concident with the satellite azimuth. It should be noted that the minimum 
range warning between two aircraft is, in general, not mutual. 
IAHI 
Aircraft which are sufficiently separated in altitude must not be re­
quired to maneuver since no collision hazard is present. Therefore, an 
14 
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I­
z 2.0 
1.0 0.5 
1.0 
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1.0 2.0 3.0 
IN 
4.0 
UNITS OF CT 
5.0 6.0 7.0 SATELLITE 
DIRECTION 
2.0 -
3.0 
Figure 2. R 
min 
Co-Altitude Alarm Region (a= 0, h= 1800) 
additional criterion, altitude separation, is incorporated in the SAVAS con­
cept, and each aircraft must periodically transmit its altitude by some type 
of coding on the f2 transmissions. 
R 
max 
The possibility has been considered of eliminating, by means of an 
T 
1. criterion, portions of the -T alarm region that extend into airspace
max T 
where collision hazards are not present; a fixed receiving gate would effec­
tively establish a maximum T criterion. Thus, non-essential parts of the 
(T/T) region, where T > T ax, could be eliminated. 
Unfortunately, it is found that when a receiving gate is sized to 
permit reception of essential alarm data, no other part of the (T/T) alarm 
region is eliminated. A derivation of this result is given in Appendix Il. 
3.1.1.2 Description of Coverage 
Employing the threat evaluation logic specified in Table I, the nor­
malized co-altitude collision alarm regions are plotted in Figures 2 through 
7. In these figures, the protected aircraft has been placed at the origin, 
and the coordinate axes have been rotated so that the relative velocity vector 
of the intruder aircraft is always parallel to the horizontal axis and point­
ing to the left. No constraint is placed on the position of the intruder air­
craft. The set of alarm regions shown in Figures 3 to 7 corresponds to 
the type A or C threats defined in Table I; Figure 2 is for type B threats. 
Type A alarm regions for satellite angles between 180 and 360 degrees 
are mirror images of the regions plotted for satellite azimuths between 0 
and 180 degrees. The shape of Type B alarm regions shown in Figure 2, 
remains constant and only the orientation of its major axis varies with 
changes in the position of the satellite. 
16 
Table I
 
Collision Threat Definitions
 
Credible Collision (TIT) Rmin Aimaxi 
Threats Criterion Criterion Criterion 
A (T/T) < 7 R>Rm n IAHI IAHmax I 
B T/T>T R<R. IAHImAH 
mm max 
C T/T<r R<R IAHI IJAHma 
The figures indicate that the SAVAS concept described in Reference [1] 
can provide alarm regions which give suitable collision warnings when 
normalized for speeds of closure and evasive action time. It should be 
emphasized again that the relative velocity vector is always constrainted 
to be horizontal and pointed to the left in these figures. For example, 
Figure 3 should not be interpreted to mean that intruders could approach 
undetected from the left; rather, if the satellite orientation is held on the 
positive X axis, the alarm region when the intruder relative velocity points 
to the right is depicted by the mirror image of Figure 7. 
The calculations on which the alarm regions are based are given in 
Appendix I. Both the exact case and approximate equations have been 
programmed for computer solution. Appendix I provides quantitative data 
on the high accuracy of the approximate formulation when reasonable satel­
lite distances are assumed. 
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3.1.1.3 Coverage Problems 
Non-Reciprocal Alarm Regions - Because the satellite orientation 
strongly affects the T/T alarm region shape, the alarm region of the pro­
tected aircraft can differ greatly from the alarm region of the intruder air­
craft. An example of this effect is shown in Figures 8 and 9, which 
illustrate the following points: 
(a) Closing aircraft may or may not receive alarm indications 
simultaneously. Hence, doctrine for evasive maneuvers must consider 
both situations. In particular, situations in which both aircraft indicate 
the same altitude, and receive simultaneous alarm indications (Figure 7) 
cause doctrinal problems that will require careful study. 
(b) The region in which either one of two closing aircraft receives 
an alarm can be almost double the size of the alarm region from one air­
craft, and this must be taken into account in considering aircraft packing. 
Satellite Elevation and Airspace Requirements - When the elevation 
angle of the satellite becomes low with respect to the protected aircraft, 
the SAVAS geometry causes the alarm regions to be extended to include 
considerable airspace where collision hazards are not present. This trend 
is shown in Figures 2 through 7. Therefore, it is desirable that the satellite 
orbits be designed to have the highest possible elevation angles in their 
regions of coverage. 
3.1.2 Alert Regions 
The function of the alert region is to force all intruder aircraft to 
attain straight, level flight prior to penetration of the collision alarm region. 
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(e=300 ; SEE FIGURE 5.) 
Figure 8. Simultaneous Alarm Encounter 
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Figure 9. Single Alarm Encounter 
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This is necessary for the formulation of evasive maneuver doctrine, since 
without such knowledge it would be necessary to ascertain the intruder s 
course in order to avoid collision. 
A number of alternatives are possible for sensing the alert regions 
and further investigation in this area is desirable. A basic problem, in 
contrast to the alarm regions, is that the alert region must be sensed by 
the intruder as well as by the protected aircraft since the intruder must 
also know that he is to terminate maneuvers. 
The possiblity that the protected aircraft could determine the alert 
region, in a manner analagous to alarm determination, and simply commu­
nicate with the intruder does not seem promising. It would then be necessary 
by some means to identify and inform the intruder that his maneuvers should 
be halted. It is not clear, how, without extensive modification, the SAVAS 
concept could be utilized to direct such messages to specific intruders 
without affecting all the other aircraft in the vicinity. 
Therefore, it shall be assumed that the intruding aircraft must be respon­
sible for determining its own penetration of alert regions. It shall also be 
assumed that scaled versions of either Type A or Type B regions shall be 
used for sensing. 
The problem of non-reciprocal regions then arises. First the alert 
regions must be wide enough to allow the intruder aircraft time to terminate 
their maneuvers before entering the alarm region of the protected aircraft. 
Further, the intruder aircraft do not know: (1) the specific shape of the 
protected aircraft alarm region, (2) the specific shape of their own alert 
regions or, (3) the orientation of these regions with respect to one another. 
Therefore, it will be-necessary to determine worst case approach situations 
26 
and scale the overall alert regions so that even in the worst case, sufficient 
time will be available to achieve straight, level flight. Unfrtunately, this may 
cause the overall alert region to be quite large, particularly for low satellite 
elevations. 
3.2 MULTIPLE INTRUDER PERFORMANCE 
SAVAS -performance in high density traffic. areas is complicated by the 
many geometric possibilities that exist for satellite position, intruder position 
and velocity vectors, and shape and orientation of the warning regions -for 
both protected and intruder aircraft. Because of this complexity, it appears 
that SAVAS multiple intruder performance will ultimately be best described 
in statistical terms. For more detailed consideration of the problem, it 
will be desirable to eventually develop some systematic classification of the 
possible multiple intruder situations into a number of tractable categories. 
In this section, several kinds of unfavorable situations are considered; 
other more normal situations are covered in Reference [1] . 
3.2. 1 Situations Resulting in Reception of Overlapping Signals 
3.2.1.1 Ambiguous Intruder Positibns 
Associated with each intruder spatial resolution cell is an ellipsoidal 
shell that contains all other intruder positions that will normally result in 
the reception of overlapping pulses at the protected aircraft. The cause of 
thee overlap is that the total of the .satellite-to-intruder distance and ihe 
intrudet-to-protected aircraft distance is essentially the same for all these 
positions,. The ellipsoid has the satellite at one focal point and the protected 
aircraft at the other; it is completely defined by-spedifying that its surface 
contains the position of the specific intruder being considered ' The 
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thickness of the shell is proportional to twice the pulse width of the f2 trans­
mission. It should be noted that the system altitude limits and the duration 
of the receiving gate do not in any way reduce the volume that produces over­
lapping returns since the signals are combined at the antenna prior to signal 
processing. 
However, if it were feasible to encode altitude data in terms of trans­
mission frequency, then, by linear filtering, the elliposidal shell of ambiguity 
could be truncated by the horizontal planes defining the altitude region of 
interest. Unfortunately, it is not clear how this approach could be imple­
mented within practical spectrum allocations. Because the ambiguity and 
transmission blind zones are a function of pulse duration, transmissions 
longer than approximately 1 to 10 ps are not feasible. Since these signals 
require about 0.1 to 1 megahertz of bandwidth, and since altitude data is 
needed from approximately 0 to 100, 000 feet in increments of 100 feet, it 
would be necessary to have a spectrum allocation on the order of 102 to 
103 MHz which is too wide to be feasible. 
The airspace contained in the ellipsoidal shell associated with each 
intruder position is primarily a function of the closing airspeed. With high 
speed aircraft, the volume from which overlapped returns will be generated 
becomes large. 
Consider, for example, two aircraft on a head-on level collision course 
where each has an air speed of (103) kn/hr. Assume further that the (T/i) 
threshold criterion is adjusted to provide 25 seconds warning and that the 
satellite elevation angle, C, equals 60 degrees. Then the range separation, 
at the point of alarm indication, is 13.9 km. The co-altitude area, in the 
plane of the protected aircraft, from which other aircraft will generate over­
lapping signals, is given by 
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Area= 4rC2 A (T+A) (8) 
(sinE 3 
where 
* is the delay in the signal from the intruder and 
A is the duration of each aircraft transmission. 
For this case (head-on) 
T 1+cos E , 	 (9) 
where R is the range at alarm indication. Hence, using the defined 
values of R andE, T= 86.5 gs and 
Area from which overlapped 2
 
signals are received per J 152 (kin) (10)
 
psec of transmission time /
 
Since aircraft usually fly in an altitude region of only about 10 kin, the air 
space volume from which overlap is encountered can be approximated by a 
cylindrical shell. Hence, 
(	Volume from which overlapped3 
signals are received per psec ) z 1520 (km) (11) 
of transmission time / 
This volume, when combined with'realistic aircraft densities and high 
closing rates, results in quite significant signal overlap problems. For 
example, in the vicinity of large airports, suchas Chicago - O'Hare Inter­
national Airport, as many as 600 aircraft can be aloft within 40 miles of the 
29
 
airport. Assuming for simplicity that they are uniformly distributed within 
3

the volume, each aircraft occupies about 1520 (kim) . Thus, with these 
parameter values and 1 psec transmissions, approximately 7 aircraft would 
normally be contained in the volume from which signal overlap is experienced. 
3.2.1.2 Multipath 
The main signal transmitted from an intruder will ordinarily reach 
the protected aircraft on a direct line-of-sight path. Additional components 
of the signal will also be received via forward scattered paths and will be 
delayed with respect to the direct signal and usually reduced in amplitude. 
However, the forward scattered signals will occasionally be of suf­
ficient amplitude and delay to interfere with the direct signals. In addition, 
forward scattered signals from one intruder can overlap the direct signal of 
another intruder. 
The incidence of this effect is frequent enough, particularly in terminal 
areas, to warrant further consideration with respect to SAVAS performance 
and signal processing. 
3.2.1.3 "Second-Time-Around" Signals 
A number of factors can cause considerable variation in the energy 
level of the f2 transmissions. These include angular variations in omni­
directional antenna gain, changes in propagation loss due to weather, varia­
tions due to equipment aging, and so forth. Because of these, and because 
extremely low false alarm performance is needed to maintain user confidence 
and avoid unnecessary, possibly hazardous maneuvers, it isnecessary to 
provide additional transmission power over that required to reach the outer­
most edge of the alert region under ideal conditions. Unfortunately the excess 
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power will then occasionally cause "second time" signals, which can overlap 
other intruder signals, unless the basic repetition rate is selected to mini­
mize this problem. 
3.2.1.4 Anomalous Propagation 
Overlapping signals can also be caused by anomalous propagation 
(ducting, etc.) which results in the reception of substantial signals from 
distant aircraft, often beyond the line-of-sight. 
3.2.2 Effects of Signal Overlap 
Overlapping signals from individual aircraft will not be coherent 
and therefore the desired signal can be changed in any manner; further, 
the signals may be overlapped only over portions of their duration. Thus, 
signal interference will affect measurement of intruder altitude, time-to­
proximity, and minimum slant range. 
3.2.2.1 Altitude Measurements 
Signal overlapping which garbles intruder altitude messages is the most 
serious effect encountered. In this situation, a co-altitude intruder on a 
threatening course could be judged as making a safe approach due to faulty 
altitude data. To minimize the problem, it appears desirable to transmit 
the entire altitude message, rather than a single bit, each period so that 
maximum redundancy can be attained. Since it is important to keep the 
transmission time to a minimum, this approach would require an increase 
in signal bandwidth by a multiple of almost 10 compared to transmission 
of a single bit pet -period. 
In Section 4, techniques are described for rejecting garbled messages. 
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3.2.2.2 Time-to-Proximity Measurements (T/T) 
If T is determined by counting the number of returns received per 
fractional delay change, overlapping can cause pulses to be missed and can 
produce a higher value of T than actually exists. This, in turn, would 
tend to cause T/T to be in error and to generate false alarms. 
3.2.2.3 Minimum Range Measurements 
The danger arising from overlapped minimum range measurements is 
again from situations where the signals combine out of phase and returns 
are lost. Because the minimum range data is utilized primarily in situations 
where rates of closure are low, and hence the geometry may be changing 
rather slowly, the overlapping condition may persist for a substantial dura­
tion relative to the period available for evasive reaction. 
3.2.3 Duplexing Situations Resulting in Loss of Signals 
During the time that a protected aircraft is transmitting, messages 
from intruder aircraft on the same carrier frequency cannot be received. 
This results in an elliposidal volume about the protected aircraft in which 
the detection of intruders will be impaired. The ellipsoid has the satellite 
at one focal point and the protected aircraft at the other. 
The intersection of this ellipsoid with the co-altitude plane of the 
protected aircraft is given by 
CA 
o A (12) 
Thus, signals from co-altitude intruder aircraft in-the region, 
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CA 
1-cos cos (a-a) 
will be obscured by protected aircraft's own transmissions. 
Two points should be emphasized: (1) the volume containing intruder posi­
tions from which messages to the protected aircraft are obscured by the pro­
tected aircraft's own transmissions, is, not limited by a spherical volume of 
radius CA; it consists of the entire ellipsoid defined above, and (2) assuming 
intruder transmissions of the same duration as the protected aircraft's, all 
intruder transmissions from within the ellipsoid will extend beyond the pulse 
width of the protected aircraft by some extent. In cases where these received 
pulses extend beyond the recovery time of the receiver, and also have suffi­
cient amplitude to make up for the reduced signal energy and the losses due 
to mismatch between the effective pulse width and the receiver bandwidth, 
detection may occur. 
3.2.4 Effects of Duplexing 
The transmissions of the protected aircraft produce an ellipsoidal 
blind region surrounding the aircraft. Although some promising methods, 
discussed below, may reduce the extent of the blind region, transfer of 
altitude data appears very difficult to accomplish. 
In view of these effects, it is necessary that the alert and alarm regions 
be appropriately scaled up so that all warnings are accomplished prior to 
aircraft entering the blind region. 
Unfortunately, the blind region occupies a sizeable volume for reason­
able transmission durations. In the most favorable satellite position, directly 
overhead, and with 1 psec transmissions, the region extends approximately 
500 feet down, and in the horizontal plane containing the protected aircraft, 
it extends 1000 feet. 
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When the satellite is not overhead, the maximum co-altitude distance 
from the protected aircraft to the ellipsoid is given by, 
CA 
S1 - cos E (14) 
At a 60 degree elevation, the maximum co-altitude extent of the blind 
region becomes 2000 feet, and for a 30 degree satellite elevation, this be­
comes about 7500 feet. 
3.2.5 Possible Approaches for Reducing Duplexing Effects 
One method for reducing the volume obscured by one's own trans­
missions would be to utilize an additional mode of operation in which periodic 
signals from the satellite would cause each aircraft to reduce its trans­
mitter pulse width and increase its receiver bandwidth to match. Since only 
the close-in intruders would be of concern in this situation, the reduction 
in range performance should not cause difficulty. More significant possibly 
would be the equipment costs for the extra mode. 
The simpler method of skipping f2 transmissions periodically and 
listening for close-in intruders, encounters the problem of synchronization 
to prevent listening periods from coinciding. The possiblity of randomizing 
listening periods might be considered, and an analysis made of the perfor­
mance statistics. 
3.2. 6 Situations Resulting in Spurious Signal Reception 
This category includes situations generated by the phenomenon dis­
cussed in Section 3.2.1, which do not involve signal overlap. 'Thus, situ­
ations involving non-overlapping spurious signals arising from multipath, 
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second-tinme-around signals,, and anomalous propagation would come under 
this heading. In addition, signals due to EMI are also included in this 
category. 
3.2. 7 Effects-of Spurious Signals 
The specific effects of, spurious, signal reception are quite. dependent 
upon the specific signal processing techniques. utilized. If multiple track­
ing channels are employed, interference effects should be minimized. The 
situation then becomes quite similar to conventional radar tracking in the 
presence of'noise and EMI, a problem which has been extensively studied 
and reported in the-literature. 
Considerably different effects would be encountered using the technique 
mentioned in Reference [1], which consists of determining T by counting the 
number of pulses received in a. fractional gate. In this case, extra pulses 
produce an erroneous reduction in the magnitude of T and as a result, T/T 
is increased. This type of error-could be extremely serious since it could 
effectively reduce the warning time below the period required for evasive 
maneuvers. 
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SECTION 4 
SAVAS EQUIPMENT CONSIDERATIONS (TWO-FREQUENCY SYSTEM) 
In order to properly evaluate the equipment feasibility in the SAVAS 
system, it would be necessary to establish a specific set of SAVAS system 
requirements along with allowable measurement tolerances. For instance, 
it is necessary to know minimum and maximum ranges, minimum and maxi­
mum closing velocity, required resolution between multiple intruders, and 
the number of intruders which must be evaluated as a collision threat in a 
given time interval. Since satellites are involved in the SAVAS system, it 
is necessary to know their orbital parameters in order to determine maxi­
mum ranges (dynamic range) and doppler frequency. 
Furthermore, pilot reaction time, flight dynamics, and flight doctrine 
all affect the kind and amount of equipment that is required, what display the 
pilot should have, and how soon the information must be displayed in order to 
take evasive action. 
In short, at this point in the study a number of plausible assumptions 
must be made before any equipment evaluation is possible. It is important, 
therefore, in the following discussions that equipment configurations should 
not be construed to be optimum with respect to a specific set of operational 
requirements. The discussions are meant only to isolate general problems 
and to estimate the amount and complexity of equipment required to perform 
the proposed SAVAS measurements. Whether or not such measurements 
provide a sure method of collision avoidance is not addressed here. 
From the equipment point of view, only the multi-intruder case will be 
discussed. 
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It is important to note what measurements are made in the SAVAS system. 
Figure 10 contains an exaggerated view of the system geometry. This geom­
etry is a dynamic geometry and not a static one. The satellite moves in its 
orbit and the aircraft at A and B have a velocity relative to each other and 
to the satellite. All distances are continually changing. Each aircraft must 
track the satellite pulse in time (a factor if multiple pulse integration is to 
be used). In particular, for the geometry shown in Figure 10, the time 
difference between the f2 transmissions of aircrafts A and B decreases 
at a rate determined not only by the relative closing velocity of the aircraft 
but also by the velocity of the satellite (weighted by a function of its position). 
While the distance S-D in Figure 9 may be small for closely spaced aircraft, 
the rate of change of S-D may be large enough to mask the relative closing 
velocity of the aircraft during the fractional gate measurement interval. In 
particular, if k is zero, the fractional gate will measure the rate of change 
of S-D. The magnitude of the error due to the above discussion has been 
discussed in Appendix mI, and no further note will be made of it here. Equip­
ment considerations will be assumed to measure T and Tk as shown in 
Figure 10. 
4.1 SATELLITE ORBIT ASSUMPTIONS 
Time limitations in this study did not permit extensive investigation of 
satellite orbits which would give the required coverage for the SAVAS system. 
It is assumed that a number of satellites placed in approximately synchronous, 
highly elliptical orbits would be established so that at least one satellite would 
be in view of a coverage area at a given time. In the SAVAS system, it:is 
mandatory that all aircraft be synchronized by the same satellite within a 
given coverage area. Furthermore, the elevation angle of the satellite from 
all aircraft in the coverage area should be sixty-degrees or greater; 
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otherwise alarm and alert regions become too distorted (See Figures 3 to 7). 
The problem of synchronizing all aircraft to the correct satellite has not been 
solved, but presumably satellite pulse or frequency coding along with opera­
tional directives could be used for this purpose. The practicality of this 
technique requires more study. 
For purposes of power calculations and to determine general satellite­
to-earth communication problems, the orbital configuration shown in Figure 
11 has been assumed for this study. A satellite apogee of 40, 000 km has been 
assumed (typical of synchronous orbits). Antenna pattern coverage of the 
earth's diameter plus 100, 000 feet of atmosphere has been assumed. The 
required satellite antenna beam-width is about 17.2 degrees. Elementary 
calculations show that the antenna power gain would be about 20-db (assuming 
an efficiency of 70 percent). 
It would be necessary to provide dynamic beam orientation to keep the 
main lobe pointed at the earth as the satellite progresses around its orbit. 
This problem, along with the method of generating primary power, satellite 
life, etc., are relevent questions but are beyond the scope of this report. 
The size and weight of an antenna to form a beam suitable for earth 
illumination such as depicted in Figure 11 should be well within the state of 
the art at UHF (L-Band). In particular, lightweight antennas built of metal­
[2]ized fiber glass and foam construction have been space qualified 
General considerations of the distortion of the alarm region as a function 
of satellite elevation angle show that the satellite would only be usable at 
elevation angles greater than sixty degrees. Therefore, the satellite would 
have to be relatively high in its elliptical orbit, maximum and minimum 
ranges would be relatively great, and useful coverage area would be limited 
when this constraint is taken into accouht. 
40 
.001 
17.20 (0.3 RADIANS) 
Gt 20db 
CIRCULAR 
POLARIZATION 
C) 
HORIZONTAL POLARIZATION/ // 
M~V/ 
'Figure 11. Basic-SAVAS System Parameters 
41
 
4.2 GENERAL DISCUSSION OF SATELLITE-TO-AIRCRAFT PATH 
The general communication path between a SAVAS satellite and an air­
craft is shown in Figures 11 and 12. Because the aircraft antenna axis can 
have almost any orientation with respect to the satellite beam axis, especially 
if the aircraft is maneuvering, the satellite emission should be circularly 
polarized. Since the useful elevation angle is about sixty degrees, the aircraft 
requires an antenna pattern coverage of about ninety degrees about its verti­
cal axis. Horizontal polarization of the aircraft pattern would make reception 
relatively independent of angle to the satellite. There would be a 3-db coup­
ling loss between the horizontal and circularly-polarized antennas. 
Flush mounted, cavity-backed spiral antennas can be used to provide the 
depicted aircraft antenna characteristics. Coverage almost to the horizon is 
possible with these antennas. Double-arm or four-arm spirals used in con­
junction with beam-forming networks can be used to measure the direction of 
incident energy from the satellite. The diameter of a spiral is approximately 
one wavelength. 
The output of any antenna is a function of the total field to which the 
antenna responds and not just the field in its main lobe. Therefore, in 
general, the output is a function of components of beam orientation loss as 
well as aperture-to-medium coupling loss that may result from scattering 
by the troposphere, by multipath due to rough or irregular terrain, and by 
terrain clutter such as vegetation, buildings, bridges, or power lines. The 
effects of tropospheric scatter at L-band are small. Figure 12 shows a 
simplified version of the effects of multipath due to local terrain. It is pos­
sible that antenna misorientation coupling through side lobes can almost 
equal coupling through the main lobe. 
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The total effect of multipath is to produce a lobe structure in space where 
the depth of the nulls are filled in by diffuse scattering and tropospheric phase 
diffusion. Typical lobing structure can vary 20-db or more . Since lobe 
structure is a function of wavelength, it is very unlikely that aircraft in the 
same general vicinity will experience identical multipath conditions. 
Multipath also interferes with synchronization performance because of 
the signal fading that results from the lobing structure. 
This problem can be alleviated by proper AGC in the system receivers 
and by controlling antenna side lobe response which is difficult to do on air­
craft. If the satellite timing signal is narrow-band, for instance, a low fre­
quency sine wave modulating a carrier, the effect of multipath will be to shift 
the phase of the sine wave envelope and thus produce synchronization timing 
errors. A relatively small phase shift in a low frequency wave produces 
relatively large microsecond timing errors. This problem can be allevi­
ated by tracking the satellite with 'a very narrow beam having very low side 
lobes - probably an impractical solution. 
One remaining solution to the synchronization problem is to transmit 
relatively narrow pulses from the satellite so that direct path and multipath 
reception can be resolved in time and amplitude. The receiver gain could 
then be controlled by a gated AGC on the highest amplitude signal. But even 
this solution is not without problems. If the multipath signal is resolved from 
the direct path signal, there is a danger of locking on to the multipath signal 
unless provision is made to prevent this. If the multipath signal overlaps the 
direct signal, pulse broadening will occur with constructive or destructive 
interference; this would affect the symmetry of the composite pulse, and 
therefore, the timing accuracy. 
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For the remainder of the discussion on equipment configuration, it will 
be assumed that the form of synchronization from the satellite will be in the 
form of a pulse with a repetition rate to be determined later. 
4.3 SATELLITE-TO-AIRCRAFT TRANSMISSION CALCULATIONS 
The basic calculation formulas in References [3] and [4] for one-way 
transmission between a transmitting site-and a receiver site were used for 
power calculations. If the basic transmission loss (that is, not including 
directive gain) in free space is denoted as: 
f - 41r = 32.45db 2O Logf + 20 LogRLfsX 20 Log + 
(15) 
where R is in kilometers and f is in megacycles, it is seen that when 
low gain antennas are used, the frequency dependence in Equation (15) indi­
cates that the service range for UHF can be made equal to that in the VHF 
-band only by using additional power in direct proportion to the square of the 
frequency. However, for a given antenna size more gain can be obtained 
at UHF than at VHF, thus partially compensating for this effect. Space loss 
as a function of frequency is plotted in Figure 13, for antenna separation of 
40, 000 kilometers. The frequency selection trade-off is between transmitter 
power and antenna size for the required directive gain on both the satellite 
and the aircraft. 
A frequency of 1200 MHz was selected for power budget calculations 
used in this study. This frequency falls in one of the bands reserved for 
navigation (960 to 1215 MHz) and is close to optimum for satellite-to-earth 
transmission, when antenna effective noise temperature is accounted for. 
45
 
0 0
-0 
00 
00 
2 
CL 
0O O 
+0­ a 
r 
_
 
o+
 
o
 
<
 
(9< 
2 
C 
-J­
00 
(8(0) 
SS071 
3OVdS 
46
 
A summary of the satellite-to-earth power calculation is given in Table H. 
The calculation is based on the power required to produce a single pulse, 
17. 5 db signal-to-noise (S/N) ratio at the output of a matched filter. This 
-6
 
signal to noise ratio produces a 0. 99 probability of detection with a 10
false alarm rate. It is seen that approximately 40 kilowatts of peak power 
is required in the satellite. This amount of peak power for a long life 
satellite is not within the present state of the art. However, by using a 
suitably coded pulse whose autocorrelation function is an impulse (for example, 
a 13-bit Barker code) ,[S1 the peak power can be reduced by a factor of 
thirteen, which is within the state of the art. The matched filter for a 
Barker code is a suitably-tapped delay line followed by an integrator. This 
technique complicates the transmitter modulator and the receiver demodu­
lator, but not unduly so. 
Up to this point, the discussion has centered around a single pulse 
signal-to-noise ratio from a matched filter. Pulse processing can be used 
to enhance the average timing accuracy and to reduce the variance of the 
average. Furthermore, the false alarm rate can be reduced to negligible 
proportions by gated pulse tracking. Figure 14 contains a simplified block 
diagram of one method of pulse tracking and smoothing. Since the maximum 
signal-to-noise ratio of a matched filter output is at the peak of the pulse, the 
pulse is first split using a delay line and a comparator. Pulse splitting by a 
factor of five is easily realized by this method. The output from the com­
'parator is fed to a voltage-controlled multivibrator servo loop whose overall 
transfer function is a low pass filter to variations in the time difference 
between the output pulse and the noisy input pulse. Setting the loop time 
constant determines the number of integrated pulses. Other closed loop 
responses can be realized by changing the open loop transfer function. 
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Table H
 
Power Calculations
 
Sr = Pt + Gt + Gr - Lt - F - L - Space Loss : other db (watts) 
Satellite Antenna Gain 
(17.2' BeamWidth; = 0.7) 
Satellite Cable Losses 
Space Loss (1200 MHz; 40, 000 Ian) 
Polarization and other losses 
20 db 
1.5 db 
185.5 db 
3. 0 db 
Tropo propagation Loss 
Aircraft Antenna Gain 
Aircraft Cable Loss 
Net Loss 
3. 0 db 
0 db 
1 db 
175 db 
Effective System Temperature 7140 K 
System Noise Power Density (N ) 
Matched Filter 2E/N for 0.99 Probability 
of Detection and 10 ­ 6 false alarm rate. 
Pulse Width: 2 p sec. PRF = 250 PPS 
Required Receiver Peak Signal Power 
Peak Transmitter Power Required (40 Kw) 
Average Transmitter Power (20) watts 
-200 dbw/Hz 
+17.5 db 
128.5 dbw 
46.5 dbw 
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Figure 14. Pulse Tracking and Smoothing 
Some care must be used in selecting the closed loop integrating response. 
With respect to a given reference time, the satellite synchronization pulses 
received at the aircraft move in phase due to the changing distance between 
the aircraft and the satellite. Integration is basically a lag function; there­
fore excessive lags in the aircraft synchronization may result if the integration 
time is too long and not well matched between aircraft. 
The variance in measuring the time of arrival of a pulse output from a 
matched filter is given by: 
1 1 1 
AR- x x , (16) 
0 
where A R is the variation in measurement due to noise, N is the number of 
pulses integrated, and ij is the integration efficiency. For example, if A R 
is required to be0.1p sec, N to be10, and I = 0.8 (typical for a low pass 
filter), then for a 17.5 dbsignal-to-noise ratio the required pulse bandwidth 
is about 525 KHz. The pulse width corresponding to this bandwidth is about 
2'gsec. Splitting this pulse by a factor of 5 would allow a timing accuracy 
of -1 0.3 p sec (neglecting equipment group delay shift due to doppler and 
variations in tracking filter lag from aircraft to aircraft). The uncertainty 
in the protection zones for this case would be ± 90 meters, plus variations 
in equipment delay from aircraft to aircraft. 
Other trade-offs between satellite power, signal-to-noise ratios, 
smoothing, constants, :and accuracy are possible. 'The above discussion is 
-an example only.. Furthermore, the pulse tracking-and smoothing function 
can be performed using operational digital techniques. The analog configura­
tion shown in Figure 14 was chosen for its simplicity. It can be built from 
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readily available off-the-shelf integrated circuits. Some digital techniques 
will be treated later, where intruder evaluation is discussed. 
4.4 AIRCRAFT-TO-AIRCRAFT TRANSMISSION CALCULATIONS 
In the proposed SAVAS system, a signal from a satellite synchronizes 
pulse transmissions from all aircraft in a given area. Each aircraft 
receives a pulse transmission from every other aircraft. By measuring 
the time delay between the receipt of the satellite signal and other aircraft 
signals, a measure of proximity can be obtained. In particular, a gate can 
be established in a protected aircraft such that if a signal falls within the 
gate and furthermore is within a coaltitude corridor, an intruding alert can 
be sounded. The above operation presupposes that "own altitude" is included 
in the transmissions between aircraft. 
Delay accuracy and delay resolution are the major considerations in 
aircraft-to-aircraft transmission. Equation (16) shows that delay accuracy 
and variation due to noise is a function of bandwidth only. 'That is, any 
pulse width can be used as long as it has a sharp leading edge. However in 
order to resolve closely spaced aircraft, it is necessary to use very narrow 
pulses. For want of system requirements, a 1 [ sec pulse has been selected 
for this study (corresponding to a 300 meter separation). The matched filter 
bandwidth is about 1 mHz. The matched filter is used because it gives the 
maximum peak signal-to-noise ratio in a system and is particularly adaptable 
to pulsed signals. 
It should be pointed out that the use of pulse-width modulation for altitude 
encoding reduces the effectiveness of matched filtering because the optimum 
match exists for one pulse width only. Altitude encoding is discussed in 
Section 4.6 below. 
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A summary of aircraft to aircraft power calculations is shown in Table Il. 
The calculations are based on a 17.5 db signal-to-noise output from a matched 
filter at a distance of 30 nautical miles. This signal-to-noise ratio gives a 
0. 99 probability of detection with a 10 - 6 false alarm rate. For a I-MHz 
bandwidth, there would be about one false alarm per second; however by 
using gated tracking with smoothing, the false alarm rate can be reduced 
to negligible proportions. 
The required peak transmitter power for the above performance was 
calculated to be about 10 watts at 1100 MHz. This does not include fading 
due to the lobing structure of multipath. Figure 15 shows the free space 
loss as a function of aircraft separation with frequency as a parameter. The 
required peak power is well within the state of the art using solid state 
devices. 
The basic problem of communication between aircraft with omni­
directional-like antenna patterns is multipath. Vertically-polarized antennas 
on the aircraft help prevent in this, but do not eliminate the problem. The 
reflection coefficient of rough terrain can be as high as 0. 8 for horizontal 
polarization and 0. 4 for vertical polarization. Over the sea, there is an order 
of magnitude of difference. The result of multipath for overlapping signals is 
a very deep lobing structure, or multiple signals for resolved reflections.-
It would be very difficult to separate direct paths from multipath on the basis 
of amplitude over a very large dynamic range. Figure 16 shows a simplified 
version of multipaths between two aircrafts. Similar paths exist between 
the third aircraft and the other two aircraft. In addition to the multipaths 
shown, there are relatively-low attenuation paths due to-ducting in tropo­
spheric inversion layers and reflections from ionized cloud formations. In 
short, the SAVAS system appears to have all of the multipath problems.that 
limit most other responding systems proposed for collision avoidance. An 
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Table III 
-Summary.of Aircraft-to-Aircraft Power .Calculation 
S -= P + G + G - L - F - L Space loss ± other db,(watts)A B t p R 
;Sum of Aircraft Ant. Gains 6 db 
Trans. Multiplexer Loss 21db 
,Other Losses 3 db 
Receiver cable .+MPLX Loss 2 db 
:Space Loss (1100 IHz; 30 Mi.-) -127.5 db 
Net Loss - 134.5 ,db 
°Effective System 'Noise Temperature 815 K 
System 'Noise Power 'Density ,(N') -200 -dbw/Hz 
Matched 'Filter.2E/N for 0.:99 Probability + 17.5 db 
-
of detection and 10 6 -false alarm rate
 
Pulse width: .1p-sec; PRF :250 PPS
 
Required Peak Signal 'Power at the 'Receiver -125.12 dbw 
Peak'Transmitter 'Power Required :(8.,67 w) 9.38 dbw 
Average'Transmitter 'Power ,(2..5 mw) 
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increase in transmitted power to compensate for fading and antenna lobe
 
irregularities will only accentuate the general multipath problems.
 
In order to reduce the effects of scattering from the ground, the elevation 
coverage of the antennas should be restricted. The aircraft antenna coverage 
could consist of two vertically-polarized azimuthal cardioid patterns with 
limited coverage in elevation. Two antennas arrays, one forward and one aft, 
could provide such patterns. At 1100 MHz, the antenna array would require 
about two feet in the vertical plane for 20 degrees elevation coverage. The 
forward and aft azimuthal patterns could be made to overlap to provide side 
coverage. The patterns could be selected so that the sum of any two aircraft 
antenna gains is not less than zero db in the azimuthal plane. Elevation 
coverage could be selected as a trade-off between minimizing multipath prob­
lems while maintaining sufficient altitude corridor coverage. A secondary 
effect of limiting altitude coverage would be to accentuate processing only 
those intruders that are close to the protected aircraft's own altitude in level 
flight, or the altitude toward which the aircraft may be climbing or decending. 
Double, and four-arm cavity-backed, flush mounted spiral antennas used 
in conjunction with beam-forming networks can be used to determine direction 
finding information. These antennas typically provide ninety-degree coverage 
patterns, and at least four antennas would be required - one in each quadrant. 
Rough direction 'finding in elevation and azimuth can be accomplished by using 
sum and difference patterns from a four-arm spiral. The operation is 
similar to monopulse technique. It is, of course, relatively expensive. 
4.5 SATELLITE-TO-AIRCRAFT SYSTEM- BLOCK DIAGRAM 
It has been pointed out previously that a narrow-band timing signal from 
* the satellite may be impractical because of multipath effects. -Furthermore, 
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a narrow-band doppler tracking receiver would te required to maintain a 
reasonable S/N for the narrow band signal. Therefore a pulsed signal 
(possibly coded) is proposed. 
Figure 17 shows a simplified block diagram of a satellite-to-aircraft 
pulse receiver for the f1 pulse. Calculations in Section 4.3 suggest a 
2 p sec pulse width which, after due processing, would provide a 4- 0. 3 
p sec timing accuracy. 
The overall bandwidth of the RF-IF section-of the receiver would be 
600 KHz allowing ± 50 KHz doppler shift. The problem in this portion of 
the receiver would be to control group delay as a function of signal amplitude 
and doppler shift. Differences in,delay from aircraft to aircraft would add to 
protection zone uncertainty. 
Additional pulse matching can be'provided by a post-detection integrator 
time constant (1. 8 I sec for a 2 t sec pulse). Using this scheme, a doppler 
tracking receiver would be unnecessary. 
A threshold could be used to discriminate against low level multipath 
signals. Pulse tracking and smoothing (as described in Section 4.3) could 
te used to ,enhance timing accuracy and reduce variation due to noise and 
interference. Keyed AGC would maintain-pulse shape which could vary 
excessively +over the wide dynamic range of the input signal from the satel­
-lite. As a fail-safe measure, some indication would have to be made that ,a 
pulse is being received -and that the pulse tracker had locked on to it. 'This 
can easily be implemented by pulse rate integration for pulses exceeding a 
threshold and by sensing the pulse tracking loop error. 
Solid state gain is available in the 1200 IHz region, and 'there is no 
reason'why the -entirereceiver could not be -made extremely ,small and 
lightweight. .Ifmodern microelectronic techniques using thick and thin 
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Figure 17. Simplified Block Diagram Aircraft Satellite Receiver 
films were used, the receiver characteristic would be reproducable, and 
could be easily mass-produced for reasonable cost. 
4.6 AIRCRAFT-TO-AIRCRAFT SYSTEM BLOCK DIAGRAM 
In the proposed SAVAS system, a satellite timing signal is received at 
each aircraft in a coverage area. This signal is used to-synchronize an 
RF-pulse transmission from each aircraft to every other aircraft in the 
coverage area. The transmission from a particular aircraft contains "own 
altitude" information which can be decoded at each receiving aircraft to 
determine the altitude difference between the sending and receiving aircraft. 
By measuring the time difference between reception of the satellite signal 
and other aircraft signals (designated as T in this report; see Figure 10), 
,a measure of proximity can be derived. Furthermore, by evaluating T 
and T, a measure of the "time-to-got" to a possible collision can be made. 
The equipment required on a protected aircraft is a satellite antenna 
and receiver to provide the master synchronizing signal (these items have 
been discussed in Section 4.5), an aircraft transmitter which is capable of 
encoding digital information, a receiver which can decode digital information 
and provide intruder signals, and an evaluator which can process multi­
intruder signals and provide threat information to the pilot in time to take 
effective evasive action. 
The basic problems in evaluating aircraft-to-aircraft signal processing 
equipment are the multipath problem and signal overlap from multiple 
intruders. Multipath problems have been discussed in Section 4.4. At this 
point in the study, there is no obvious solutions to the multipath problem 
except those already mentioned. The multipath intruder signal overlap 
problem is discussed in Section 4.6.5. 
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Figure 18 shows a simplified block diagram of a plausible aircraft 
SAVAS system. The entire system is synchronized by the smooth output 
pulse from the satellite receiver shown in Figure 17. The system is based 
on sending and receiving a 1 p sec pulse between aircraft. 
4.6. 1. Antenna Switches and Diplexer 
The forward and aft antenna switches, as well as the send-receive 
RF-multiplexing switch, can be implemented with modern PIN-diode solid 
state switches. These switches have typical isolations of 50 db at 1100 MHz 
and typical switch settling times of less than 0. 1 pt sec. Several hundred 
watts of peak power can be handled. Therefore, the receiver recovery time 
between transmit and receive would be determined primarily by the receiver 
bandwidth. Gating the receiver chain would prevent processing leakage 
signals. However, if one channel were assigned to process the leakage 
signal, a closed loop self-check could be made in the system. 
4.6.2 Aircraft Transmitter and Modulator 
Solid state gain at 1100 MHz and a peak power level of 20 watts is 
within the state of the art. 
Assuming that digital data is coded on the f2 pulse by sending one bit 
per period, the modulator could consist of a pulsed frequency shift keyer. 
The frequency would depend on whether a primary one or a zero is to be 
transmitted. For a 1 p sec pulse, the required shift would have to be about 
1 MHz; otherwise the pulse spectra would overlap. This would require an 
overall bandwidth of about 2 MHz in the transmitter receiver chain. Matched 
predetection filters coiild be used at the receiver bi-polar detector input to 
separate binary ones from zeroes. 
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There may be more optimum forms of bi-polar modulation for sending 
digital data, but time did not permit detailed study of this matter. In any 
event, group delay through the system must be matched from aircraft-to­
aircraft to prevent excessive error in alarm region boundaries. 
4.6.3 Aircraft Digital Data Encoder 
The bandwidth requirements to send all of the digital data during a single 
repetition pulse -mightbe impractical in this system. However, the digital 
data can be sent serially: one binary bit for each repetition pulse. Since the 
pulse is also to be processed as intruder position, each pulse must be coded 
as a binary one or a binary zero, and it must be synchronized with the 
satellite f pulse. Furthermore, in order to process serial binary data,1 
it is necessary to be able to derive data (one or zero), timing (bit position), 
and sync (end of binary word) at the receiver. 
There are many methods of sending serial digital data and deriving the 
required information to process it. The equipment is categorized as digital 
data modems (modulator - demodulator). The digital data link depicted in 
Figure 18 shifts four bits at a time into the coder where it is changed to a 
five-bit redundant code with at least one bit in each code group. A special 
code is used to develop the message sync pulse in the receiver. The redun­
dancy in the code group is used to develop timing information in the receiver. 
The five-bit group is shifted'into the transmitter modulator one bit at a time 
in synchronization with the satellite synchronization pulse. The control box 
developes the 4 for 5 bit shift signals and other system timing pulses. The 
digital data link technique described above is well known and has been used 
on radio links and land-lines. 
Other data link configurations are possible, but the special require­
ments of the SAVAS aircraft signals must be kept in mind; that is the signals 
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not only transmit binary data, they also must be accurately timed in order to 
determine aircraft separation. It is doubtful whether links with these special 
requirements are presently commercially available, but their development 
should be well within the state of the art. 
4.6.4 Receiver 
The RF, IF, and local oscillator portions of the aircraft-to-aircraft 
receiver are well within the present state of the art using modern micro­
miniature techniques. Figure 15 shows that the receiver would have to 
operate over about a 40 db dynamic range; AGC probably could not be used. 
The receiver would require very fast recovery for overload signals in order 
to resolve closely-spaced intruder signals. It would also require well­
conttolled characteristics for overlapping signals. Group delay as a function 
of frequency and signal amplitude would have to be well-matched from air­
craft to 'aircraft in order to maintain alarm zone uncertainty tolerances. 
Gated amplifiers would be required to prevent processing the aircraft's own 
transmission due to leakage through the antenna RF-switches, although 
processing controlled leakage could be used as a self-check for reliability 
purposes. 
The detection portion of the receiver in Figure 18 performs two functions. 
First, it detects the presence of a binary-one or zero coding in the pulse. 
Second, it sends all pulses to the evaluator as intruder information. A 
threshold would have to be established to prevent excessive false alarms 
due to noise and to minimize the effect of low level multipath signals. 
The form of the detector would depend on how the serial binary infor­
mation was coded from pulse to pulse. It is denoted as being bi-polar in 
Figure 18 to distinguish its decoding function. For frequency shift keying, 
the detector could take the form of a frequency discrimibiatoi followed by 
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post detection integration for pulse matching. The bi-polar threshold would 
sense signal polarity as a binary one or zero and send the bits to the digital 
decoder. The absolute value circuit would simply be a logical OR-circuit 
(for on's and zeroes) whose output would be used as intruder information in 
the evaluator. All of these functions could be easily realized with commer­
cially available, integrated circuit sense comparators and digital logic 
circuits. Delay as a function of dynamic signal range would have to be con­
trolled in these circuits. 
4.6.5 Digital Decoder 
The digital decoder develops data, sync, and timing from the binary 
output of the threshold circuits. Because of the possibility of multi-intruder 
signals being present, the digital data would have to be gated into the decoder 
under control of the evaluator tracking loop gates. The evaluator would 
sense overlapping intruder signals and inhibit the digital data as well as the 
intruder information from being processed until the intruders resolve 
themselves. 
Digital parity or error correcting codes could be used to detect and/or 
correct digital data transmissions. However, this would increase the number 
of bits to be transmitted for a given message, the amount of time to transmit 
the data, and the cost of equipment. However, some indication of digital data 
reliability will be necessary. Because range rate is to be used to evaluate 
intruder velocity, it is possible that a number of redundant messages can be 
sent while the evaluation process is -going on. In this case, single or double 
parity bits may be sufficient to indicate digital data trouble. In any event, 
before a proper evaluation of intruder threat can be made, the digital decoder 
will have to indicate that a complete data word has been received for a given 
intruder and that the data is valid. Therefore, there will have to be 
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synchronization between the evaluator and the digital data receiver. This 
information is indicated in Figure 18 as the SYNC and Parity inputs to the 
evaluator. 
4.6.6 Multi-Intruder Tracking Gates 
One of the reasons for developing collision-avoidance systems- such as 
SAVAS is to better utilize airspace in crowded corridors. Therefore, it is 
very likely that the system will have a number of intruders within a protected 
aircraft's alarm region at the same time. This is especially true in landing 
patterns near airports. Because digital data is to be transmitted serially on 
successive PRF pulses, it will be necessary to separate intruder signals and 
track them separately. It is also very probable that intruder signals may 
overlap in time, and, therefore, some provision must be made to treat 
these cases.
 
There are a number of ways to mechanize tracking gates. Since the 
PRF in the SAVAS system is fixed, a tracking and smoothing loop similar' 
to the one shown in Figure 14 appears to be the most economical. Other 
multivibrators synchronized with smoothed satellite f pulses, when, 
used with suitable logic gates, could be 'used to develop minimum and 
maximum gates. 
A digital version of a tracking loop is shown in Figure 19. It consists 
of an up-counter, a down-counter, and input gating logic. In principle, the 
up-counter is reset by the satellite f1 pulse and begins to count. When an 
intruder pulse occurs, it is first gated by the minimum range and/or the 
maximum range gates which are developed from the up-counter. If the 
intruder is within either gate, it transfers the number in the up -counter to 
the down-counter. This number corresponds to the intruder delay. The 
down-counter holds the number until the next satellite f 1 pulse, at-which 
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Figure 19. Simplified Block Diagram of a Digital Tracking Gate 
time it begins to count down to zero. Gate logic on the down-counter establishes 
a gate when the count is near zero, and will maintain the gate until an estab­
lised time after counter turn-around. The intruder will fall within the gate 
and repeat the procedure on the next PRF period. After the intruder has 
been gated a number of times, "lock logic" establishes that it is a true 
signal and sets up a tracker-locked condition. This condition inhibits the 
intruder from other trackers by gating it out of the data stream. It also 
establishes a priority signal to the other trackers so that all trackers do 
not attempt to lock on to the same signal. The tracker can be designed to 
maintain lock (flywheel) through missing pulses and will disconnect itself 
after "too many" missing pulses or on command from a disconnect signal. 
The digital tracker has been described in some detail here because it 
has the potential to be expanded to handle a large number of intruders by 
placing a digital memory in place of the down-counter and storing intruder 
time delay in successive memory locations. Then, by successively reading 
the memory into a down-counter, tracking gates associated with a memory 
address could be established. The logic for this scheme has not been studied 
in detail. There are many problems associated with it, and more study is 
required before applicable trade-off factors can establish it as a practical 
solution for tracking a large number of intruders. 
The problems associated with multi-intruder cross-over and multipath 
signals on signal tracking are complex. Multipath signals, if they were 
sufficiently stable, would simply be processed as an intruder. Otherwise, 
they would be detected, tracked, and lost with the net result of tying-up 
tracking channels. For sigials which, cross over, tracking channels may 
exchange signals (or lose them due to distructive interference), with little 
consequence provided that the signals were not being evaluated at the same 
time. In the case where crossing signals were being evaluated the signal 
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overlap would be detected, and the evaluator would reject the information 
until the signals resolved themselves. In some situations, a relatively long 
time may be required before all signals get processed. 
Finally, the intruder trackers could be biased'to lock-on to the lowest 
T intruders first. However, low T intruders may not be the greatest threat; 
a high speed intruder at maximum range may have the least time-to-go" 
to threatened collision. 
4.6.7 Alarm Evaluation Multiplexer 
It has been established that in order to evaluate intruder collision 
threat, each of the intruders must be tracked separately. In crowded air­
space situations, the number of tracking and evaluation channels may be 
quite large (no requirements have been designated for this study). While 
analog tracking channels, such as the one shown in Figure 14, or the digital 
tracker shown in Figure 17 can be mass-produced at relatively low cost 
(using monolithic IC technology), the complexity of the T and coaltitude 
evaluators may increase the required equipment cost an intolerable amount 
if each tracker has its own evaluator. 
Figure 20 shows a simplified diagram of a tracking gate multiplexer. 
A number of trackers are shown. If it is presupposed that trackers can be 
disconnected if after evaluation the target presents no hazard, then the 
number of trackers can be limited according to some queing theory based on 
maximum expected traffic density. Figure 20 shows only one evaluator for 
purposes of illustration. Actually, several evaluators could be multiplexed 
between a large number of tracking channels. The number of tracking 
channels, the number of evaluators, and the multiplexer complexity trade-off 
factors require considerable study before the practicality of this idea can be 
established. 
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Figure 20. Simplified Block Diagram of Tracking Gate Multiplexer 
In any event, the tracking channels should be developed so that they are 
iterative circuits (that is, outputs can be connected to inputs in an endless 
cascade). The trackers require input gating and queing logic at their signal 
inputs so that no two trackers lock on to the same signal. As shown in 
Figure 20, each tracker must have a locking priority and must also delete 
the signal it is tracking from those further on in the cascade. In addition, 
each tracker must send signal overlap logic to every other tracker in the 
cascade (detailed input and overlap logic in the form of iterative circuits 
have been designed but the detailed design is not included in this report). 
In operation, the multiplexer first senses whether a tracking channel 
has locked on to a signal. If it has, the channel tracking gate is connected 
to the evaluator. The connect signal also tests for tracking gate overlap 
with all other tracking channels. In case of overlap, the multiplexer steps 
to the next channel. If there is no overlap, the selected tracking-gate 
gates serial digital data associated with the tracked signal into the digital 
decoder and thence to the evaluator. The tracking gate is also used to gate 
the selected signal for 7- measurement. When the T measurement has 
been completed, and when a valid digital message has been received, the 
evaluator makes a potential hazard decision. If there is a threat, an alarm 
is given. If there is no threat, the evaluator sends a break-lock signal to 
the tracker. In either case, an end-of-evaluation signal is given to step the 
multiplexer to the next locked channel. 
The "no threat" decision can be based on various combinations of alti­
tude difference, absolute delay, opening relative velocity, and T. By break­
ing lock with non-threat intruders, and by proper tracker queing so that all 
delay intervals are covered, only those intruders which are potential hazards 
continue to be tracked. All other intruders continue to sequence in and out of 
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.evaluation. The multiplexer.could also be designed td give priority to, that 
is, evaluate more often, intruders that are potential hazards. 
The minimum SAVAS system that an aircraft would carry would be the 
satellite receiver and the aircraft-to-aircraft transmitter with the "own" 
altitude digital encoding and modulator equipment. If some information 
concerning proximity of other aircraft were required, the aircraft receiver, 
with -delay gating, would offer a -proximity warning. 
A standard SAVAS system, or any system which requires altitude 
comparison, would require the full complement of equipment including 
the trackers, multiplexers, and evaluators described thus far in this Section. 
4.6.8 Tau Evaluation 
In collision-avoidance systems, the accepted criterion for a collision 
hazard is when the measured time-to-go to projected collision, generally 
designated as Tau, drops below a specified value. Tau can be determined 
by dividing the separation of two aircraft by their relative rate of closure. 
In the two-frequency SAVAS system, only an approximation of separa­
tion can be obtained (See T in Figure 10). Since the system RF pulses are 
not coherent, doppler cannot be used to determine rate of closure. In the 
SAVAS system, T contains components of the satellite velocity. Under 
suitable assumptions, discussed in Section 4 and Appendix III, the difference 
between T and the true relative rate of aircraft closure is small. Such will 
be the assumption here. 
An average value of T can be measured by counting how many pulses 
are received as an intruder passes through a fixed range gate. The value 
of the , accumulated count is directly proportional to the gate width and the 
PRF, and is inversly proportional to T. In particular, if the gate-width 
71 
is some fixed fraction of the intruder range, the value of the accumulated 
count will be proportional to Tau. Figure 21 shows an exaggerated version 
of the operation of a fixed fractional gate. The number of pulses, NF , is 
proportional to r times a constant. In this case, r is measured when the 
intruder leaves the gate. The problem is how to implement a gate that is 
always a fixed fraction of the intruder range and hold the gate position until 
the intruder passes through it. 
It has been suggested (Reference [ i] ), that a fixed series of exponential 
gates be established by suitable logic connected to a binary counter. This 
would be somewhat cumbersome under multi-tracker multiplexing conditions. 
The intruder could appear anywhere in a given fractional gate, and the 
intruder would have to transit at least two fractional gates before assurance 
was made of a correct evaluation. Furthermore, either accumulating 
counters would have to be connected to each fractional gate, or else one counter 
would have to be gated to the fractional gate in which the intruder appeared. 
Either way, considerable logic would be required. 
Figure 22 shows a simplified functional diagram of a dynamic fractional 
gate r evaluator. This unit establishes a fractional gate at the range of the 
intruder, holds the gate until the intruder passes through it, and accumulates 
the Tau count for evaluation. Thus, under multiplexing conditions, the intru­
der pulse establishes the gate position, and evaluation time is decreased. 
The principal of operation is similar to the digital tracking gate dis­
cussed in Section 4.6.5. In Figure 22, Counter A counts up until it is reset 
by the satellite f sync-pulse. When the tracker multiplexer connects a 
tracking gate to the control unit, the associated intruder pulse is gated by 
either the minimum range gate or the alarm gate. If the intruder is within 
either gate, it transfers the number in Counter A to down-Counter B and 
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and. Counter C. This number corresponds to intruder range, R. The control 
holds the number until the next satellite fI sync pulse, at which time it 
begins to count down to zero. A digital comparator compares the count in 
down-counter B to only the first n-N most significant bits of Counter C. This 
Nis equivalent to dividing the number in Counter C by a number equal to 2 
Thus, the gate fraction must be chosen to be an inverse power of two (this 
is not much of a limitation). When the numbers compare, there are R/2 N 
counts left in down counter and the fractional gate is started. When counter 
turn-around occurs (zero count), the gate is stopped. This time period 
corresponds to intruder range for the previous PRF period. A recycle 
gate is then established so that the contents of Counter C (which have been 
left undisturbed) are transferred to down-Counter B and cycle repeats, 
holding the fractional gate width and position until the intruder pulse passes 
outside of the gate. The first pulse outside of the gate establishes an . 
evaluation-complete condition. Intruder pulses which have been gated by the 
fractional gate are accumulated by a r counter. The count is compared 
digitaly with a minimum number or numbers, and an alarm decision is made 
(various numbers could generate alarms of varying degrees). 
The case arises where an intruder may establish a fractional gate and 
then not leave it (no closing rate). This case can be taken care of by 
allowing 7- count overflow to terminate the evaluation. Another case arises 
where a r gate is established for enough counts to make it look like a real 
threat, but the intruder enters and leaves from the same side of the gate. 
This case can be taken care of-by sensing for a complete gate transit. 
Other cases, such as very slow intruders at long range, can be sensed by 
T count overflow, and the evaluation cycle can be terminated before a 
-complete gate transit is made. Tau evaluation time can be decreased in 
this manner. 
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Lack of system performance requirements and of time did not permit 
optimized trade off studes for the PRF, the T gate fraction, stability, and 
accuracy. General formulas relating to these subjects are given in Table IV. 
Table I'V 
Summary of Evaluation Formulas 
r Time to go 
F G = Fraction of T 
(Range)T NrF F)PRF x F G NF = 	 No. of pulses in 
fractional gate 
PR-F= Rep - rate 
= closing velocityPRFxF GV 
2. =FT F 	 R = RangeNF 
PRF x F
 
R 1 -F G
 
3. The number of pulses in a gate, G, of any length is: 
G 	 x PRF G = ing sec 
V = in hundreds of mi/hr. 
4. 	 Time-to-go in terms of-R, V, FG: 
R = in miH 
7 = 35.21 (1 - FG)sec. V = in hundreds of mi/hr. 
5. Rate of change T in terms of V is: 
= 0. 1:72 V y, see/ V in 	hundreds of mi/hr. 
sec
 
6. 	 1 nautical mile- = '6.17 i sec (one way). 
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4.6.9 Alarm Evaluator 
Detailed equipment studies of an alarm evaluator would have to be 
centered on system requirements. Generally, digital comparison logic 
circuits exist for such measurements as A < B < C , where A and C 
are fixed digital numbers and B is a variable digital number. Inputs to 
an alarm evaluator can be combined in almost any logical manner to 
produce display lights or tones. 
4.6.10 Alarm Display 
Detailed equipment studies of displays for alert signals would have to 
be centered on system requirements and operational procedures, which 
are not yet available. 
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SECTION 5
 
THREE-FREQUENCY SAVAS EQUIPMENT CONSIDERATIONS
 
Time ,did not permit extensive evaluation ,of the three-frequency SAVAS 
system. Power levels should be about the same as -for the two-frequency 
system. However, a cursory look at the increased multipath problems 
(above those for the two-frequency system) indicates tnat the three-frequency 
system may be impractical. 
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SECTION 6 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 RESULTS 
The primary findings of this review of the SAVAS approach are: 
(a) The basic SAVAS concept provides aircraft with alarm indications 
that give suitable collision warning when normalized for speed of closure and 
evasive action time. 
(b) Preliminary analysis indicates that equipment required to imple­
ment the basic concept lies within presently developed technology. 
(c) Fundamental system problems exist with regard to large scale 
utilization of the concept; a number of these problems are identified in this 
report, and others may also be present. All these problems must be 
resolved for the SAVAS concept to attain operational candidacy. 
(d) At the present stage, it is too early in the conceptual development 
for meaningful cost estimates to be made. 
6.2 INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS 
It is clear that assessment of the overall feasibility of the approach 
requires consideration of the problems remaining and the prospects for 
their successful resolution. The basic outcome of our evaluation of these 
factors, and the findings above, is that while the basic concept has been 
verified, the possibilities of successfully resolving the remaining operation­
al problems and of maintaining economic feasibility do not appear promising. 
The difficulty of the development task appears to be very formidable. In 
particular: 
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(a) All major system problems must be either solved or reduced to 
negligible importance; the successful utilization of SAVAS can be seriously 
impaired by inability to cope with any one of the major problem areas. 
The fact that a significant number of problems exist multiplies the difficulties. 
(b) The elements of the SAVAS system are highly interactive, and 
therefore modifications to alleviate particular problems will almost always 
have a strong impact on other aspects of performance. Consequently, in 
most cases, methods for dealing with the problems will be severely con­
strained. 
(c) The cost of the SAVAS approach is uncertain at this point and 
represents an additional problem area. 
It should be emphasized that this assessment is an estimate of prob­
abilities, not an assertion of the impossibility of SAVAS development. It 
primarily reflects empirical engineering results that are encountered 
with tasks of what are believed to be similar levels of difficulty. 
6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
In order to be meaningful, any overall recommendations must involve 
consideration of alternatives that are beyond the scope of this study. For 
this reason, except for the subject of task priorities in further SAVAS work 
which does fall within the scope of the study, recommendations have not 
been treated. 
With regard to priorities, it is strongly recommended that the first 
stage of further SAVAS effort be devoted to the basic system problems of 
operational utilization. Detailed design and economic trade-off studies should 
be postponed until most of the system problems are resolved, since equip­
ment requirements cannot be firmly established until then. 
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APPENDIX I
 
CALCULATION OF CO-ALTITUDE ALARM REGIONS
 
By definition, thl alhrm regions surrounding a protected-aircraft are 
the locus of all pdints such that, 
T 
Assuming a two-aircraft encounter, either aircraft may be considered 
the protected aircraft and the fblloving is true, 
C T-R+D -S, 
whereh 
R 1/2 1/2-1/2S = . ) D= (S-R)i 
We now. choose a cartesian coordinate system such that, 
=i x + j y + k z i (cos e cos a)+j RKdos esina)+kR (Sine) 
= iS (cos E cos ) + j,S (cos cos 'a)+ k S (Sin E). 
Then 
1/2. 
D =1JS2+2_ 2RScosE cosecos (a a)+sinE sineI 1/. (18) 
Let A =cos e cose cos (a - a) + sin,e sin e. 
1/2/2 2RSA iD = S2+Theii 
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and 
1/2 
CT=R+1S2+ R2-2RSAI -S . 
Solving for R 
OT (S + -)
 
CT + S (1-A) (19)
 
This equation defines an ellipsoid of revolution with the protected air­
craft at one focus, the satellite at the other focus, and the intruder aircraft 
at some point on the surface. 
Since other means are provided for avoiding collision when the intruder 
and protected aircraft are at different altitudes, we confine our attention 
to the co-altitude case. In this case, the elevation angle, e, of the intruder 
is zero and 
A = cos c cos (a - !) 
To find the alarm regions surrounding the protected aircraft we 
now solve the equation 
T R+D-S
- < 7 T,< 0, (20) 
where the assumption is made that the satellite is so far away that S may 
be ignored. 
84 
R can be obtained by differentiating
 
2 1/2
 
R= +y)
 
giving, in terms-of the relative heading of-the intruder 
R = V cos (a - h) 
and fl can be obtained from 
1 / 2 
is2 +R2 -2RSAID= 
D = IR Vcos (a -h) -S Vcos ecos (c -h)' 
The quantity T + ' T can then be shown to be equal to 
T+ -T = I D (R+-D -S)+ (D-+R) V'T cos (a-lh) - ViScose cos (a -h). 
(21) 
Without loss of generality, we can now set the relative heading, h, of 
the intruder equal to ir, set the equation equal to zero, and solve for R 
as a function of a with a -and e as parameters. 
A great simplification can be made in these equations by assuming that 
:the distance 'to the satellite is much greater than the distance to the intruder. 
That is 
S>>R. 
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We can take the limit of Equation (19) 
+CT 
CT (+-2) CTCR =lira CT+ S (1- A) I- A 
and, again considering the co-altitude case only, 
CTR = (22)
1-cose cos (a-a) 
If we now solve the equation 
T 
-- 7< T 
T 
the result is 
R <_v - (T Cos ECos (a- CI)R< VTyr -os E cosa (23) 
where, once again the relative heading of the intruder has been set equal 
to 7r. 
Equation (23) is plotted in Figures 3 to 7 with the elevation angle, e, 
and the azimuth angle, a, of the satellite as parameters. The exact 
equation (21) has been programed for a 7030 computer and the results com­
pared with the values given by Equation (23). The comparison shows that, 
for satellite distances greater than 1000 kin, the error in Equation (23) 
never exceeds 0.2 percent. 
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, APPENDIX II 
RECEIVING GATE LENGTH OR MAXIMUM T CRITERION 
Equation (22) gives the range to the intruder 
CT 
R 1-coscos (a-) ' (22) 
and Equation (23) gives the (TIT) alarm region as 
R < V- COS a - COS E COS a 
-- 1-cos E cos (a- a) 
If we wish to establish a maximum gate length, Tmax, beyond which no 
signals are accepted, this gate length must be at least long enough to receive 
the signal from an intruder with maximum closing speed on a collision course, 
using the worst case position of the satellite. A collision course is defined 
by a = 0 and the worst case condition of the satellite position is given by, 
E= Emn and a = ?r , 
since this makes the denominator of Equation (22) a maximum. Under the 
same conditions, Equation (23) shows that 
R =V 7r. 
max max 
Then from Equation (22) 
R (1 +cose * V i-(1 +cose )(4 
Rmax (min max + min) (24) 
max C C 
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The range to the intruder when he first penetrates the gate is then 
. CT V 7 (1 + cos E mn) 
R max mmn (5G =max 1-coscos (a-a) -cosccos (a-C) (25) 
7i 
2 min 
It is clear that the gate can never cut off any part of the alarm regions 
since the denominator of Equations (25) is the same as the denominator of 
Equations (23) and 
Vmax T (I + cos Emin) > V T (cos a - cos E cos a) 
max mm-­
min- - 2 
The shape and size of the maximum gate region can be found by noting that 
Equation (25) is the same as Equation (6) in Section 3 with Rmin replaced 
by V ax. Figure 7 is then also a plot of the maximum gate when the scalesmax 
are multiplied by Vma x '- (I + cos emin). The same remarks concerning 
orientation of the Figure apply. 
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APPENDIX III 
EFFECTS OF SATELLITE VELOCITY 
In Appendix I it is shown that when the satellite is sufficiently far away, 
the warning regions can be calculated with negligible error by assuming the 
.satellite to be at an infinite distance. An even more important reason for 
restricting the satellite distances to large values is the effect that satellite 
motion produces on the measurement of T. 
In Figure 23, V is the vector velocity of the satellite, with respects 
to the protected aircraft, e the angle that Vs makes with the line of sight to 
the protected aircraft, and T the angle between the lines of sight to the pro­
tected aircraft and -intruderaircraft. 
From Appendix I 
If we assume that IR is zero then 
CT= D-S 
We can now write (see Figure 23) 
= V CosO, V cos(0 + ()=V (cos 0cosy-sin0sinT), 
and
 
CT = V (cos 0cos T - sin 0 sin T- cos 0). 
For satellite distances greater than 1000 km, the angle op will be small. 
Cos op as well approximated by unity and sin T amay be replaced by (p. 
Then 
CT - V q.sin . 
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SATELLITE 
Vs 
z 
NOTE: IN CO-ALTITUDE CASE, V IS 
CONSTRAINED TO LIE IN THE 
X-Y PLANE, AND THE ANGLE, h, 
IS THE ANGLE V MAKES WITH 
THE POSITIVE X-AXIS 
7 
INTRUDER AIRCRAFT 
I7 
Ya 
~PROTECTED 
" -- AIRCRAFT 
Figure 23. SAVAS Coordinate System 
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The largest value of p are attained when the intruder and satellite positions 
are such as to form an isosceles triangle. Then qp may be approximated 
by R/S and 
V R 
sCT = C T - sin 6. 
When 0 is small, that is, where the satellite velocity in nearly parallel to 
the line of sight to the satellite, the effect on T is negligible. However, 
when S is nearly v /2 , C T due to satellite velocity may become as high 
as 
V R 
CT = - s 
and this can be a significant quantity unless S is very large. For example, 
assume a satellite distance of 1000 kin, an intruder range of 20 km and a 
satellite speed of 6 km per second. Then 
20 
CT - 1000 6000 = - 120 meters per second. 
Since 0 can be either 7r /2 or - 7r /2 depending on the direction of satellite 
motion, this value of C T can either add to or subtract from the component 
of C T caused by relative motion between protected aircraft and intruder. 
Greater satellite distances will reduce the effect of satellite velocity not 
only by increasing the value of S , but also by tending to make V smaller.5 
For example, a satellite at synchronous distance, on the equator, will have 
no relative velocity with respect to the surface of the earth, and thus Vs 
will be simply the velocity of-the protected aircraft. 
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